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UNIVERSAL ANAL YTICS, INC v. MAcNEAL-SCHWENDLER
CORP.: PREDATORS BY HIRE?
VINCENT A. DARPINO
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about predation and predatory conduct as a
violation of federal antitrust laws.' Economists and legal scholars have
developed a number of theories and standards for determining whether
conduct is predatory, and courts have incorporated several of these theo-
ries into law.2 Until the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in UniversalAna-
lytics, Inc v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp.,3 however, cases regarding
predatory conduct have centered almost exclusively on pricing practices
and refusals to deal.4 In that unprecedented decision, the Ninth Circuit
considered a claim of an antitrust violation based on predatory hiring.5
The court defined unlawful predatory hiring as the acquisition of talent
or personnel "not for purposes of using that talent but for purposes of
denying it to a competitor."6
This Comment analyzes the validity of a cause of action under the
federal antitrust laws based on predatory hiring, examining the standard
recently offered by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether a firm's hiring
practices are predatory. The goal of this Comment is to present guide-
lines for the formulation of an objective standard on which courts can
rely to determine accurately whether a firm's hiring practices violate sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.7 Because predatory hiring is a virtually un-
known cause of action, much of the analysis will be drawn by analogy
from recent court decisions and legal scholarship discussing other preda-
tory practices, and in particular, predatory pricing.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of the Sherman
Act, specifically highlighting the methods by which predatory conduct
can be proved a section 2 violation. Part II analyzes the Ninth Circuit's
Universal Analytics decision. Part III criticizes the standard set forth by
the Ninth Circuit to identify predatory hiring, concluding that it does not
1. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 720 (1975) (formulating workable test for
distinguishing predatory pricing from competitive pricing by examining relationship be-
tween cost and price); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 263, 264 (1981) (concluding that there is "no sufficient reason for antitrust law or
the courts to take predation seriously"); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L &
Econ. 289 (1980) (comparing various theories of predatory pricing).
2. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
3. 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990).
4. See, eg., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (pricing);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (pricing); Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (refusal to deal).
5. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1258.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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offer a workable rule for identifying such hiring practices. Finally, Part
IV offers an alternative, objective standard on which courts can rely to
identify predatory hiring accurately.
I. BACKGROUND
Congress' enactment of the Sherman Act (the "Act") in 1890 embod-
ied the pervasive "trust-busting" attitude of the era and a growing public
disdain for the increasing wave of monopolization that was sweeping
through industrial America.' The Act provides that "[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor." 9 Thus, the language of section 2 bans not only
the actual monopolization of a market but any attempt to monopolize a
market as well.
A. Elements of a Section Two Violation
Three elements are necessary to make out a successful monopolization
claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) the defendant's possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) the defendant's willful
acquisition or maintenance of such power; and (3) antitrust injury caused
by the defendant's actions.)1
Although the definition of monopoly power is subject to some debate,
it is generally accepted that such power includes the ability to control
prices or exclude competition in the relevant market. 1 Such monopoly
power results from the accumulation of a substantial share of market
power.2 The second element, willful acquisition or maintenance of such
8. Presidential candidates of all three parties supported a national antitrust law dur-
ing the 1888 Presidential campaign. See E. Fox & L. Sullivan, Cases and Materials on
Antitrust 33 (1989). The Act is premised on the belief that consumers are the benefi-
ciaries of competitive markets and these consumers are negatively affected by a reduction
of competition and subsequent monopolization of an industry or market.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
10. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1257
(9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has always required that the first two elements be
explicitly met for claims of monopolization. See Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Rc-
sources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 363 (9th Cir. 1988). Recently, the circuit made the third
factor an explicit requirement as well. See Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d
1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
11. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
12. The market share required to constitute monopoly power, however, has not been
clearly defined. Various courts have used different shares of market power when deter-
mining whether monopoly power existed. See, eg., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90% market share sufficient to constitute monop-
oly power); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 307, 352 (D.
Mass. 1953) (75% market share constitutes monopoly power). But see Twin City Sport-
service, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 1975) (50% mar-
ket share insufficient to constitute monopoly power); Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 424
(60% market share probably not enough to constitute monopoly power). There does not
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power, is concerned with questionable business practices as distinguished
from superior business acumen. 3
The elements of an attempt-to-monopolize violation differ from those
of an actual monopolization violation. Through the evolution of case
law, two elements of attempted monopolization claims have emerged:
(1) the defendant must possess a specific intent to injure competition and
(2) the offending acts must create "a dangerous probability that the at-
tempt to monopolize will be successful."' 4 To prove specific intent, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant sought to destroy competition.'3
Specific intent, however, can be proved by inference from conduct; that
is, anti-competitive conduct may be a manifestation of a specific intent to
injure competition.' 6 To prove a dangerous probability of success, the
plaintiff must prove that, at the time the anti-competitive acts occurred,
the defendant already had enormous market power. 17
B. The Goals of Section Two
Section 2's ban on monopolization and attempted monopolization was
enacted to protect and further competition.'8 It was passed with con-
sumers and small business interests in mind. 19 The rationale behind fed-
eral antitrust laws is the guarantee of the highest quality at the lowest
possible prices. Lower prices, however, may not always be the result of
competition, and may not always be in consumers' best interest. Busi-
ness entities may actually lower prices in the short term to accomplish
long-term anti-competitive objectives. As federal courts have been will-
ing to recognize, the lowering of prices in certain situations may be an
anti-competitive attempt to monopolize. °
seem to be any clear-cut percentage of market share that all courts will use to distinguish
monopoly power from non-monopoly power.
13. See Oahu Gas, 838 F.2d at 363.
14. See United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985). But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have
both the power to monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as
demanding any 'specific,' intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes
unconscious of what he is doing.").
15. See American Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1118.
16. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981).
17. "When evaluating the element of dangerous probability of success, [the court
does] not rely on hindsight but examine[s] the probability of success at the time the [anti-
competitive] acts occur[ed]." Id. See also American Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1118; Tran-
source Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., 725 F.2d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 1984).
18. See Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 Antitrust L.J. 21, 24
(1985).
19. See id.
20. "Although antitrust law is not usually concerned with setting a limit on price
competition, under certain conditions low prices may have anti-competitive effects." P.
Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law Ila. (1978).
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C. Predatory Pricing as a Section Two Violation
A firm that attempts to drive out competitors by setting unremunera-
tive prices is not acting in a pro-competitive manner but, rather, is engag-
ing in behavior that is predatory. 21 Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan,
noted commentators on antitrust law, have defined predatory behavior as
"6any course of conduct by a dominant firm designed to drive out, disci-
pline, or set back competitors by acts that, but for their anti-competitive
impact, would not be economically sensible for the dominant firm."22
The United States Supreme Court has categorized pricing tactics
designed to forgo short-term profits in the hope of eliminating long-term
competition as illegal attempts to monopolize in violation of section 2.23
Specifically, predatory pricing is the lowering of prices below present
cost to drive out competition with the hope of recouping the resulting
losses in the future by charging monopoly prices. A classic example of
predatory pricing exists where a dominant firm 24 prices consumer goods
below the average costs incurred to produce such goods, thereby forgoing
profits. The firm, willing to suffer initial losses so that smaller competi-
tors will collapse under disproportionate price competition, eventually
drives smaller competitors from the market. Later, the dominant firm
recoups past losses by charging higher monopoly prices in an unchal-
lenged market. The resulting monopoly leads not only to higher prices,
but to fewer choices for consumers and often inferior products.
The identification of such predatory conduct has posed problems,
however. Various scholars have proposed standards to help courts iden-
tify predatory pricing. Although no consensus exists among courts or
economists regarding precisely what criteria are relevant for identifying
predation,25 several commentators have suggested various standards for
determining whether a firm's pricing practices are predatory.26 The most
21. See id.
22. E. Fox & L. Sullivan, Cases and Materials on Antitrust 211 (1989).
23. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 12 (1911).
24. A dominant firm is one that possesses a lion's share of a given market and is
considered to be the industry leader.
25. See 3 Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulations § 10.03[6] (1986).
26. Areeda and Turner's test of predatory pricing, based on marginal cost and/or
average variable cost, concludes that a price below reasonable anticipated average varia-
ble cast should be conclusively presumed unlawful. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 679,
732-33 (1975). Another test for identifying predatory practices such as pricing has been
cast by Judge Posner. According to Posner, predatory pricing should include only pric-
ing at a level calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient competi-
tor. See R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 184, 188 (1976). These are
by no means the only tests offered for the purpose of identifying predatory pricing. Some
scholars propose a case-by-case analysis to determine whether there was predation or
maximum theoretic consumer benefit. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman
Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 901, 903 (1976). Others propose a structural diagno-
sis for analyzing predatory behavior. Factors indicative of the market structure and the
dynamic effects of competition are most important to these scholars. See Joskow &
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 Yale L. J. 213, 222-40
[Vol. 60
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noted standard for identifying predatory pricing has been put forth by
Philip Areeda and Donald Turner.27 Areeda and Turner base liability
under section 2 on pricing tactics that fall below a firm's marginal or
average variable cost for producing the unit.2" Most other standards pro-
posed by commentators have been variations on the Areeda and Turner
standard.29 Courts have applied variations of the suggested standards in
their determination of whether a firm's pricing practices are predatory. a
D. Supreme Court Guidance in Predation Cases
The Supreme Court offered yet another standard for identifying preda-
tion in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp..a Although
the predatory practice at issue in Aspen 32 involved the refusal to deal
with a competitor,3 3 which differs somewhat from predatory pricing and
hiring practices, the Court nonetheless provided a helpful framework for
analyzing all instances of predation.
The test formulated in Aspen called for an objective analysis of both
the predator and the competing victim of the act, as well as of the effect
the predation has on consumers.34 In analyzing the refusal-to-deal claim,
the Court concluded that three questions must be asked before character-
izing conduct as exclusionary and predatory: (1) what effect does the
conduct have on consumers?; (2) what effect does it have on smaller ri-
vals?; and (3) what is the effect on the "predatory" actor itself?.35
In Aspen, the Court emphasized that the most significant inquiry was
(1979). See generally, McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & Econ. 289 (1980)
(comparative look at the merits and shortcomings of various proposed models to analyze
predation).
27. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 725.
28. A price below reasonable anticipated average variable cost should be conclusively
presumed lawful. See id.
29. See 3 Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulations § 10.03[6] (1986).
30. See, eg., Henry v. Chloride, 809 F.2d 1334, 1344 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying
Areeda and Turner's test, and holding that if defendant's prices are below short run
marginal cost, then there is presumption of predation); Indian Coffee Corp. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 896 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985); Ad-
justers Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1984) (prices below average variable cost conclusively estab-
lish plaintiff's prima facie case of predation); Northeastern Tele. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d
76, 91 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982) (same).
31. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 587. Exclusionary practices, such as refusals to deal, have long been
held predatory and in violation of section two of the Sherman Act. See Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951).
34. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1984).
In Aspen, a large ski resort refused to issue and honor tickets in conjunction with a
smaller resort in an arrangement that had proved mutually beneficial to both parties in
the past and attractive to consumers who enjoyed having a choice of skiing at either
resort. See il at 589-91.
35. Id at 605.
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into the effect of the predatory act on the actor itself.3 6 As the Court
observed, when the challenged actions do not maximize the actor's pres-
ent efficiency or profits, but instead serve the sole purpose of reducing
long-term competition without competing on the merits, the behavior
may be classified as predatory.37
The Supreme Court's objective analysis for identifying predatory prac-
tices in Aspen has proved an effective development in antitrust law. By
concentrating on objective criteria such as the defendant's profitability,
the effects on competitors, and the effects on consumers, courts have been
able to determine more accurately whether particular actions are preda-
tory. Relying on Aspen, the Ninth Circuit in Universal Analytics recently
expanded the concept of predation as a violation of the Sherman Act to
include hiring practices.38 In Universal Analytics,39 the Ninth Circuit
failed, however, to follow the Supreme Court's emphasis on objective
analysis in offering a standard for identifying predatory hiring.
II. UNIVERSAL ANALYTICS, INC. V. MACNEAL-SCHWENDLER CORP.
In Universal Analytics, the plaintiff and the defendant were both en-
gaged in the production and development of NASTRAN, 4 a computer
software program used in the aerospace field. The defendant, with a
ninety percent market share, was the dominant firm in the NASTRAN
market, while the plaintiff, with a five percent market share, was its pri-
mary competitor. 4' The plaintiff alleged that the defendant attempted to
illegally obtain and/or maintain a monopoly in the NASTRAN market
by engaging in a series of predatory acts.42
The thrust of the plaintiff's action centered on a fifteen month period
during which five of the six NASTRAN technicians employed at the
plaintiff's firm departed and went to work for the defendant.43 The
plaintiff, in bringing suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Act, claimed that
the departures had a detrimental effect on the plaintiff's ability to de-
velop further its version of NASTRAN and to compete effectively with
the defendant." The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment,4 relying on the fact that several of the employees
36. See id. at 608.
37. See id. at 610-11.
38. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258
(9th Cir. 1990).
39. 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990).
40. These programs were initially developed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration for use in the field of aerospace technology. See id. at 1257. Both the
district court and the court of appeals defined the relevant market for the purposes of
deciding this antitrust litigation as NASTRAN programs. See id.
41. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1257.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170,
1182 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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who left the plaintiff firm for employment at the defendant firm were
dissatisfied with conditions at the plaintiff firm, and that the defendant
did not initiate contact with the employees." It also found that the em-
ployees were put to use by the defendant in NASTRAN related tasks.'
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's predatory hiring
claim. 48
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a private antitrust action
claiming predatory hiring as a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act
could be maintained as a valid cause of action.49 The court's definition of
predatory hiring was based on Areeda and Turner's description of the
offense:
Unlawful predatory hiring occurs when talent is acquired not for pur-
poses of using that talent but for purposes of denying it to a competi-
tor. Such cases can be proved by showing that the hiring was made
with predatory intent, i.e., to harm competition without helping the
monopolist, or by showing a clear non-use in fact. Absent either of
these circumstances . . . employment should not be held
exclusionary.50
Significantly, the court seemingly deferred to Areeda and Turner's
view that predatory hiring claims based on exclusionary employment
could be identified only by a clear showing that the predator intended to
deny a competitor talented employees.51 Accordingly, the court held
that employment should not be held exclusionary absent a finding that
the "monopolist" subjectively intended to hire preclusively or a finding
of "clear non-use in fact."52
In Universal, the plaintiff claimed that it met the subjective intent re-
quirement by offering into evidence an inter-office memo from the de-
fendant firm stating that those hired from the plaintiff's firm would
"wound" the plaintiff's business." Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found
that the "wound memo" was insufficient to find the requisite elements of
46. See id. at 1176.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1176-77. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the defendant had
refused to hire these same employees when they had sought employment in the past.
Instead, the plaintiffs claimed, the defendant waited for the plaintiff to train the employ-
ees and then offered them positions. See id.
49. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258
(9th Cir. 1990).
50. UniversalAnalytics, 914 F.2d at 1258; see also P. Areeda & D. Turner, An Analy-
sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 2c (1978)[hereinafter Antitrust Law].
Areeda and Turner did not formulate a viable test for identifying predatory hiring prac-
tices, however. See id. They believe that it is highly likely that a firm would use impor-
tant talent once acquired, and that courts should not attempt to judge whether the
acquired talent was put to the most efficient use. In their view, such judgments would be
difficult to make and remedies would be difficult to formulate because of the interests of
society in allowing employees to move freely from employer to employer. See id.
51. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1258.
52. See id.; see also Antitrust Law, supra note 50, at 2c.
53. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1258-59.
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predatory conduct.54 By rejecting such proof, the court suggested that it
will be difficult for plaintiffs to meet their burden of proving that the
defendant firm possessed the subjective, predatory intent required for the
judicial identification of predatory hiring. 5
In addition, the court invoked the legitimate-business-purpose test of
Aspen Skiing in concluding that the memo did not evince sufficient proof
of predatory intent.56 Specifically, the court found that the memo did
not undermine the defendant's "legitimate business reasons for hiring
much needed and competent computer programmers."5 " The court rea-
soned that the legitimate purpose test set forth in Aspen 58 could be satis-
fied in cases of predatory hiring by a showing that the hires are put to
some use in their new place of employment.5 9
Accordingly, the court concluded that the facts in Universal Analyt-
ics ° did not support a cause of action for predatory hiring. The court
did, however, specifically endorse future applications of a cause of action
for predatory ,hiring. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit, while breaking
ground for a cause of action based on predatory hiring, seemingly
blocked its application by setting forth an elusive standard that offers
little guidance in identifying predatory hiring.
III. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S METHOD OF
IDENTIFYING PREDATORY HIRING
The Ninth Circuit's willingness to consider predatory hiring as a viola-
tion of antitrust law is an important and appropriate development in the
law. As the court recognized, the antitrust laws were enacted for the
protection of competition.' Federal antitrust laws must be administered
to rectify any unfair restraints of competition that may lead to a monop-
oly in a given market. As many federal courts have accepted, predatory
acts can have the effect of unfairly restraining competition.62
54. See id. at 1259.
55. See infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
56. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1258.
57. Id. at 1259.
58. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-10
(1985).
59. The court stated that because the defendant put the five employees to use, the
defendant's actions were in pursuit of a legitimate business purpose. See Universal Ana-
lytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990).
60. 914 F.2d 1256.
61. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). James Rill, the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, believes that the Sher-
man Act should operate as a "physical force in the universe of commerce" to protect the
benefits of competition. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
62. See Henry v. Chloride, 809 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1987); William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1981);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965,
987-88 (N.D. Cal 1979), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955
(1983).
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Similarly, predatory hiring practices can have the same anti-competi-
tive effects. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell,63 by hiring away key employees of a competitor a firm
can alter the structure of an industry and unfairly affect competition."
Predatory hiring that results in the same potential anti-competitive ef-
fects as predatory pricing should, therefore, be included within the scope
of the Sherman Act.65
Although the Ninth Circuit appreciated the potential harm of such
hiring practices and stood willing to recognize a cause of action for pred-
atory hiring, the court's design for identifying such practices is problem-
atic. The Ninth Circuit held that predatory hiring could be identified
only by showing: 1) that the hiring was made with predatory intent or 2)
that there was "clear non-use in fact."66 This standard, however, does
not provide courts with a useful measure for effectively determining
whether a firm's hiring practice is predatory and anti-competitive.
A. The Incompleteness of a Test Based Solely on Clear Non- Use
The clear non-use prong of the Ninth Circuit's test offers little help in
identifying most cases of predatory hiring. As defined by Areeda and
Turner, clear non-use is the hiring of an employee without putting that
employee to any use.67 The hired employee serves the sole purpose of
depriving a competitor of the employee's talents. This type of hiring and
subsequent non-use of a competitor's employees clearly violates the pro-
competitive language of federal antitrust laws and would easily be con-
sidered predatory by any judicial standard.
The problem, however, is that clear non-use rarely, if ever, exists. Few
firms, if any, would actually hire an individual without putting the hire
to any use whatsoever. Thus, only a rare fact pattern would implicate
this standard. Consequently, a standard that identifies predatory hiring
by relying on clear non-use alone will prove unhelpful in reducing a sub-
stantial amount of such predatory behavior. Under a clear non-use stan-
dard, as long as firms put the lured employee to even marginal use, they
will survive a section 2 challenge to their hiring practices. Easily able to
mask predatory hiring practices with evidence of employee use, these
63. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
64. See id. at 259. "Certainly, if a competing trader should endeavor to draw custom
from his rival, not by offering better or cheaper goods, employing more competent sales-
men, or displaying more attractive advertisements, but by persuading the rival's clerks to
desert him under circumstances rendering it difficult or embarrassing for him to fill their
places, any court of equity would grant an injunction to restrain this as unfair competi-
tion." Id.
65. Both practices, predatory pricing and hiring, can be implemented to hamper a
competitor's ability to compete and lead to monopolization of a market.
66. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258
(9th Cir. 1990).
67. See Antitrust Law, supra note 50, at 2c.
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firms will continue to stifle competition in a given market and consolidate
market power in a particular industry by luring away talent.
B. The Inaccuracies of a Test Based on the Predator's Subjective
Intent
Even more troublesome is the Ninth Circuit's requirement that subjec-
tive intent of predatory hiring be proved in order to sustain a cause of
action.6" Judicial use of the term "predatory intent" has often proved
troublesome.69 This is so because introducing subjective evidence of
predatory intent provides little, if any, basis for effectively analyzing
claims of predation.70 Courts can better serve the goals of federal anti-
trust legislation by identifying predatory types of behavior, rather than
relying on the arduous practice of searching for predatory intent.7 '
In other contexts, including predatory pricing, courts have foregone
analyses of subjective intent in favor of analyses predicated on objective
factors.72 Several circuits have already done so with respect to claims of
68. In past antitrust cases involving predation, the Ninth Circuit has not always re-
quired that plaintiffs come forth with evidence of the defendant's subjective state of mind.
In past predation cases, the court has determined that predatory behavior can be identi-
fied through the use of objective factors. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1034 (1981) ("Predatory pricing may be
proved by examining the relationship between defendant's prices and costs.").
69. International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722-23 (5th
Cir. 1975). Predatory intent has never been clearly defined. Because it is difficult to
distinguish a vindictive intent to harm a competitor from legitimate competitive actions
that may produce the same results, courts can better eliminate acts of predation by identi-
fying the types of behavior which violate the Sherman Act. See id.
70. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699. Predatory intent provides little, if any, basis for
adjudicating liability in cases of predatory pricing. See id.
71. See International Air, 517 F.2d at 722-23.
72. One area in which the courts have already concluded that an objective analysis
should be applied over any subjective intent analysis includes analyses of fourth amend-
ment claims concerning searches and warrantless arrests predicated on probable cause.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). The determination of whether a
search was legally reasonable and supported by probable cause requires examination of
the information possessed by searching officials. See id. This determination, however,
should not include an inquiry into the officials' subjective intent. See id. The relevant
question is whether a reasonable officer would have acted in a similar manner under the
existing circumstances. Subjective beliefs held by the officials surrounding a search are
irrelevant. See id.
Likewise, the constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest depends on the existence of
probable cause. See United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1990). Prob-
able cause must be measured by existing objective factors. See id. Thus, the existence of
probable cause must be viewed in light of circumstances as they would have appeared to a
"prudent, cautious, trained police officer." Id. at 1485-86. Where an officer has probable
cause, as measured objectively, an analysis of the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant.
See id.
Another area of law where courts have discarded inquiry into subjective intent in favor
of an analysis predicated on objective factors involves fifth amendment double jeopardy
claims. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
Because subjective intent is often not ascertainable, courts should assess objective data
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predatory pricing.73 In its most recent decision on predation, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that "intent is not a basis of liability (or a ground for
inferring the existence of such a basis) in a predatory pricing case under
the Sherman Act."74 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has expressed its pref-
erence for condemning predatory acts rather than predatory intent."
Other circuits, however, continue to infer predatory intent from ac-
tions.76 Courts should follow this lead and refrain from using subjective
intent as a basis of analyzing claims of predatory hiring.
Distinguishing predatory intent from aggressive competition is diffi-
cult.77 As some courts have observed, an intent to eliminate competition
cannot by itself establish proof of an attempt to monopolize violation.78
This is significant because the intent to outperform, or even eliminate,
competition is central to a competitive market.79 As one court has sug-
gested, "if courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a
forbidden 'intent', they run the risk of penalizing the motive forces of
and existing circumstances when considering double jeopardy motions under the fifth
amendment. See id.
Judges have also expressed a desire to abandon analysis of subjective intent in favor of
an objective approach with respect to discrimination claims. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). "Frequently the most probative evi-
dence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed
to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds." Id.
Yet another area where courts have recognized the benefits of an objective analysis
without giving regard to subjective intent has been the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for
motions filed to achieve an improper purpose. See, eg., In re Grantham Bros., 922 F.2d
1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) (in a case involving imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on
debtor's attorney for bringing of frivolous, improper collateral attack, court imposed ob-
jective test to determine attorney's purpose for bringing the attack, rather than searching
for subjective intent). "Although the term 'improper purpose' can be construed to re-
quire an improper subjective intent, this court analyzes an allegedly improper purpose
under an objective standard." Id. at 1443. It is important to note that this case was
decided by the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 1438.
73. See A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400-02 (7th Cir.
1989); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell, 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).
74. AA. Poultry Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402. "Intent does not help to separate competi-
tion from attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard competition." Id.
75. See International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722-23
(5th Cir. 1975).
76. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITI" Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. See A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir.
1989); Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
78. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981) "Direct evidence of intent to vanquish a rival in an honest
competitive struggle cannot help to establish an antitrust violation." Id.
79. "The mere intention of [defendant] to exclude competition. .. is insufficient to
establish a specific intent to monopolize by some illegal means. To conclude otherwise
would contravene the very essence of a competitive marketplace which is to prevail
against all competitors." Blair Foods, 610 F.2d at 670 (citation omitted). See also Buffalo
Courier Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, 601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1979) (intent by
itself is not sufficient to find an attempt to monopolize violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act).
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competition."'8 1 Objective evidence of unfair conduct is indispensable to
show that the defendant sought victory through unfair or predatory
means.
8 1
Most firms, if not all, possess an intent to capture as much market
share as possible. This intent to outperform competitors is what keeps
markets competitive. Courts, in their search for predatory intent, should
not risk outlawing behavior that has contributed to a competitive spirit in
a given market. After all, a desire to extinguish a rival or competitor is
the essence of competition.8 2
Requiring proof of subjective intent also complicates litigation.8 3
Plaintiffs will be forced to search for evidence of overly aggressive, as
opposed to competitive, behavior in an effort to convince the judge or
jury that the defendant's actions were in fact predatory. 84 Such a re-
quirement will increase the costs of discovery and litigation without in-
creasing the accuracy of the court's decisions.8 5
If courts are using the term "predatory intent" to refer to a set of
objective economic criteria that allow them to infer the requisite intent
from overt conduct, then "we can slice [the intent requirement] away"
and concentrate on the objective factors themselves in analyzing claims
of predation. 6
80. A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at 1402. See also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell, 724
F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (" 'Intent to harm' without more offers too vague a standard in a
world where executives may think no further than 'Let's get more business' and long-
term effects on consumers depend in large measure on competitors responses.").
81. See William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028.
82. Id.
83. The court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald warned that "[j]udicial inquiry into subjective
motivation ... may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous per-
sons, including... professional colleagues." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817
(1982). See also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402
(7th Cir. 1989) ("Lawyers will rummage through business records seeking to discover
tidbits that will sound impressive (or aggressive) when read to a jury. Traipsing through
the warehouses of business in search of misleading evidence both increases the costs of
litigation and reduces the accuracy of decisions.").
84. See A.A. Poultry, 881 F.2d at 1402.
85. As previously discussed, drawing a distinction between subjective, predatory in-
tent and hard, aggressive competition creates great difficulty for the court. See supra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text. Even where evidence indicative of an intent to harm
a competitor is found, it may not be strong enough to qualify as evincing a predatory
intent. In Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 912 F.2d 1256 (9th
Cir. 1990) the plaintiff presented evidence of an internal memo from the defendant firm
which stated that these hires would wound the plaintiff, and the court found that this
"wound memo" was insufficient to establish an existence of predatory intent. See id. at
1259.
86. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (Ist Cir. 1983).
PREDATOR Y HIRING
IV. OBJECTIVE CRITERIA SHOULD BE USED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A FIRM'S HIRING PRACTICES VIOLATE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Necessity For an Objective Analysis
Rather than struggling to find or discern subjective intent, courts
should apply a more practical approach to identifying predatory behav-
ior. A review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act and federal
antitrust case law suggests that this approach should concentrate on ob-
jective criteria.
Although Congress did not provide enforcement agencies with definite
quantitative or qualitative tests for gauging violations of the Sherman
Act, Congress indicated that a company's actions "had to be functionally
viewed, in the context of its particular industry."' Broad and flexible
objective standards by which to evaluate the purposes of business behav-
ior most accurately identifies predatory practices. Such standards would
avoid the evils of both over-inclusion and over-exclusion. Courts must
formulate tests for identifying predatory behavior in such a way as to
avoid being over-inclusive, thereby punishing aggressive competition. At
the same time, proper precautions must be taken to avoid the pitfalls of
an over-exclusive test that would permit predatory behavior to remain
undetected."8 Incorrectly labeling predatory behavior as non-predatory
will also result in substantial long-run welfare losses if the behavior de-
ters entry to or induces exit from the market and will result in the con-
centration of a monopoly power.8 9
Because a profit-maximizing firm will only depart from short-run max-inizing behavior if the firm fully expects that the move will lead to
greater long-run profits, the most accurate way to determine whether
present behavior is predatory is to analyze objective market factors and
expected effects on the market in the long run.90 The Supreme Court has
stated that it is senseless to consider charges of predation if the structure
of the industry makes future recoupment of present losses suffered in
furtherance of the predation unlikely.9' This results-oriented analysis
supports the contention that objective criteria should be considered over
subjective intent in identifying predation. 92 Use of objective criteria will
87. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962) (emphasis added).
88. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1031 n.18 (9th Cir. 1981).
89. See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89
Yale L.J. 213, 229 (1979). An under-inclusive test will allow predatory behavior to stand,
thus enabling the predator to drive out competition and achieve monopoly status and
harming long-run consumer welfare. See id. at 222-23.
90. See id.
91. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
92. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc v. Rose Acre Farms; Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th
Cir. 1989).
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make it possible to determine the likelihood of future success of the
predation.
B. Objective Factors Have Been Used in Identifying Predatory Pricing
Objective analysis has been applied regularly in cases involving preda-
tion.93 Such analysis has produced more predictable and accurate re-
suits. Certain objective criteria, such as market characteristics, can be
most helpful in assessing claims of predatory pricing.
Market characteristics considered most important in analyzing preda-
tory pricing fall into three basic categories.94 The first category includes
factors indicative of short-run monopoly power. Such factors include:
an examination of the dominant firm's market share; the number and size
distribution of firms already in the market; the stability of market shares
over time; and historical evidence of profits earned by a dominant firm.95
The second category consists of factors relating to the conditions of
entry into the mnarket. Certain structural characteristics of a market af-
fect entry conditions and the ability of potential competition to provide
an effective constraint on the pricing behavior of a dominant firm. These
include: the amount of capital required for a new firm to enter at mini-
mum efficient scale; whether the dominant firm has successfully estab-
lished significant brand preferences in the eyes of consumers by being
first; the ease with which productive resources or assets can be trans-
ferred from one form to another; the nature of the entry process in the
particular market; and the nature of information flows in the market, in
particular the availability of information concerning the perceptions of
risks of entry.96
The third category involves the dynamic effects of competitors or en-
trants on the costs of production and the quality of products offered to
consumers. Questions to be asked include: (1) Has the dominant firm
been the primary source of technological innovations or have smaller
firms and entrants been the innovators?; (2) Is the market/industry grow-
ing or is it in a state of decline?; and (3) Do prices change with cyclical
changes in supply and demand?97
C. Objective Factors Best Suited For Identifying Predatory Hiring
This objective approach to analyzing predation should be extended to
cover claims of predatory hiring as well. In the area of predatory hiring,
93. See Cargill, 479 U.S. 104; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985);
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989); Barry
Wxight Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
94. See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 Yale
L.J. 213, 224 (1979).
95. See id. at 225-27.
96. See id. at 227-31.
97. See id. at 231-34.
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what is needed is an objective approach that can accommodate important
market differences such as the characteristics of firms, the probability of
error in characterizing practices predatory, the costs of such errors, and
the implementation costs of alternative policy approaches.98
Courts can use many of the same objective factors that have been ad-
vocated for use in claims of predatory hiring.99 Factors indicative of
short-run monopoly power, the potential for new entrants to enter the
market successfully, and the effects existing competition has had on the
industry are as crucial in an analysis of predatory hiring as they are in
analyzing other acts of predation. In addition, the uniqueness of a claim
of predatory hiring requires an analysis of additional objective criteria to
answer the three questions above successfully.
Courts should consider the availability of qualified personnel within
the industry, and the cost and time required to train new personnel,
when analyzing the structure of an industry. Such an analysis will aid in
accurately gauging the barriers to entry in a given industry.
In addition, the salary structure and profit margins of the industry
should be considered to determine whether the predator is paying exorbi-
tant salaries and foregoing profits with the hope of monopolizing the
market. An analysis of this information will more accurately gauge the
intentions of the defendant than will a messy search for a subjective in-
tent of predation. Business entities can be expected to act in a profit-
maximizing manner. Any objective evidence to the contrary may spur
further judicial inquiry into claims of predation.
Courts should also analyze the internal structure of the predator when
analyzing a claim of predatory hiring. The manner in which a firm has
conducted staffing in the past may prove enlightening in determining
whether the hiring in question is in line with the firm's normal course of
business, or whether the new staffing appears excessive. Similarly, in-
quiries into whether the defendant has trained its own employees in the
past or has always hired trained personnel may help in the determination
of whether a specific hire is predatory.
Courts can also look to the profitability and efficiency of the hiring in
question when making a judgment on predation. If the hire will prove
unprofitable but will eliminate competition, courts may well conclude
that the hiring was predatory."°°
98. See id. at 218.
99. See supra notes 72-75.
100. Closely related to this point is how the "predator" puts the new hire to use. Cf.
Universal Analytics, Ina v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.
1990) (clear non-use of a new hire may be considered predatory hiring). An analogy to a
professional sports franchise may illustrate this point. If a baseball team with six healthy
starting pitchers acquires a divisional rival's "ace" starter through free-agency and then
makes little or no use of the player (Le., he is not inserted into the starting rotation and is
only used occasionally in middle relief), deductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that
the pitcher was only acquired to deny the talent to the competitor.
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CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's willingness to recognize predatory hiring as an
antitrust violation should be commended. The court's reliance on subjec-
tive intent, in the absence of clear non-use, to identify the predatory prac-
tice, however, does not provide a workable standard for determining
whether such a violation actually exists. Courts should place more em-
phasis on objective factors to determine whether a firm has violated the
antitrust laws through predatory hiring. Clear non-use is but one factor
that can be relied upon in analyzing claims of predatory hiring. Reliance
on objective factors, such as market structure, available talent, and salary
structure in conducting such analyses will produce more accurate and
predictable outcomes in the courts and provide more useful guidelines to
business entities.
